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Towards Effective Implementation of the EU Environmental Crime Directive? 
The Case of Illegal Waste Management and Trafficking Offences
Ricardo Pereira
The adoption of the European Union (EU) Environmental Crime Directive in 2008 
marks a significant step in the European Union’s process of integration. The 
Directive is unique in creating a supranational legal framework for harmonizing 
environmental criminal law. Yet there are a number of deficiencies in the Directive 
which may compromise its effective implementation and enforcement by the Member 
States. Particularly noteworthy is that the Directive does not define specific types and 
levels of penalties or any rules on prosecution or jurisdiction. This article analyses 
the main features of the illegal waste management and trafficking offences and 
penalties under the Environmental Crime Directive and surveys the implementation of 
those offences by specific EU Member States. It aims to make a broader assessment of 
the consistency and effectiveness of the implementation of the Directive, assessing the 
implications that it may have on the enforcement of environmental law in the Member 
States.
INTRODUCTION
The increased cost of safe waste disposal has driven an export trade to many of the 
world’s least developed countries, where there are often gaps and weaknesses in the 
regulatory framework applicable to the waste disposal sector.1 Illegal waste shipments 
are widely thought to cross national borders easily, particularly in developing 
countries which have few inspection systems and technologies available.2 This 
practice of ‘waste dumping’ has been condemned by some nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) as amounting to ‘garbage imperialism’.3 This problem is 
exacerbated in light of the increased costs of waste disposal in developed countries.4
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1 T. Fröhlich et al., ‘Organised Environmental Crime in the EU Member States’ (2003), at 3.
2 C.W. Schmidt, ‘Environmental Crimes: Profiting at Earth’s Expense’, 112:2 Environmental Health 
Perspectives (2004), A96, at A103.
3 See, e.g., K.R. Stebbins, ‘Garbage Imperialism: Health Implications of Dumping Hazardous Wastes 
in Third World Countries’, 15:1 Medical Anthropology (1993), 81.
4 There are estimates suggesting that while in the late 1980s the average cost of safe waste disposal in 
an OECD country was between US$100 and US$2,000, in Africa it was between U$2.50 and $50. See 
G. Hayman and D. Brack, ‘Workshop Report: International Environmental Crime: The Nature and 
Control of Environmental Black Markets’ (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London 1998), at 
13; see also H.-J. Albrecht, ‘The Extent of Organised Environmental Crime: A European Perspective’, 
in: F. Comte and L. Kramer (eds.), Environmental Crime in Europe: Rules of Sanctions (Europa Law 
Publishing, 2004), 91; and T. Fröhlich et al., n. 1 above.
Globally it is estimates that illegal trade and dumping of hazardous waste materials 
has an overall value of between US$10 and 12 billion.5 From that total it is estimated 
that organized crime involving environmental impairment generates revenues of 
between US$ 1 billion and 2 billion annually through dumping of toxic waste.6
The so-called ‘eco-mafia’ in Italy in many ways personifies the worst forms of 
environmental criminality in Europe. Italy’s waste disposal contracts are notoriously 
controlled by criminal groups. According to the Italian authorities, 11 million metric 
tonnes of toxic and industrial waste are deposited annually in some 2,000 illegal 
domestic dump sites in local waterways or in the Mediterranean. Research by the 
Italian environmental NGO Legambiente on Italy’s eco-mafia shows a far higher than 
average incidence of recorded environmental crime in the traditional mafia 
strongholds of Campania, Puglia, Calabria and Sicily.7 Among the 1,734 waste-
related infractions recorded in Italy in 2002, 39 percent were committed in those four 
regions.8 Not only in Italy but also in other European Union (EU) Member States 
several studies have shown the infiltration of criminal organizations into the waste 
disposal sector.9
The criminal offences under Article 3(b) and (c) of the 2008 EU Environmental 
Crime Directive10 aim to improve the implementation deficit of specific EU waste 
legislation,11 including Regulation 1013/2006 on shipments of waste,12 as well as 
international environmental agreements which are binding on the Union legal order, 
particularly the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements 
of Hazardous Waste and Their Disposal, which was adopted by the European 
Community in February 1994.13 Significantly, the Basel Convention contains 
provisions requiring States to introduce penal measures as part of their enforcement 
strategies, that is, a requirement that State parties take ‘appropriate measures’ to 
ensure the application of the agreement and punishment of violators thereof. 
Specifically, Article 4.3 of the Basel Convention states that ‘the parties consider that 
illegal traffic in hazardous wastes or other wastes is criminal’.14
Although the ‘Ban Amendment’ to the Basel Convention is not in force, the EU has 
introduced a ban on the export of hazardous waste to non-OECD countries under 
5 Ibid. See also C. Nellemann et al. (eds.), The Environmental Crime Crisis: Threats to Sustainable 
Development from Illegal Exploitation and Trade in Wildlife and Forest Resources: A UNEP Rapid 
Response Assessment (United Nations Environment Programme and GRID-Arendal, 2014), at 19.
6 See H.-J. Albrecht, n. 4 above.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 See T. Fröhlich et al., n. 1 above; and T. Fröhlich et al., Organised Environmental Crime in a Few 
Candidate Countries (2003); and Europol, Threat Assessment 2013: Environmental Crime in the EU 
(Europol, 2013), at 6.
10 Directive 2008/99/EC of 19 November 2008 on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal 
Law, [2008] OJ L328/28 (‘Environmental Crime Directive’).
11 European Commission, 29th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU Law (2011), 
COM(2012) 714.
12 Regulation 1013/2006 of 14 June 2006 on Shipments of Waste, [2006] OJ L190/1, Article 2.35.
13 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and their 
Disposal (Basel, 22 March 1989; in force 5 May 1992) (‘Basel Convention’).
14 Ibid., Article 4.3 (emphasis added).
Regulation 1013/2006.15 Still, there is evidence of continuous non-compliance by a 
number of Member States with the Regulation.16 Some Member States have not 
effectively prevented the illegal exports of hazardous waste for disposal or recovery 
to developing countries. For example, trade statistics suggest that much e-waste is still 
shipped from the EU to Africa.17 Overall, it is estimated that illegal waste trafficking 
amounts to roughly 20 percent of all the waste shipments in the EU.18 It is thus 
paramount for the EU Member States to implement the waste export ban to 
developing countries, particularly following the notorious incident in 2006 in which 
Trafigura exported waste from the Netherlands, causing the injury of thousands of 
people and environmental damage in Côte d’Ivoire.19
This article aims to assess the consistency and effectiveness of the implementation of 
the 2008 EU Environmental Crime Directive,20 particularly on the implementation of 
the waste offences under Article 3(b) and (c) of the Directive. The article begins with 
a discussion of the implementation measures introduced by EU Member States to 
transpose the waste offences under Article 3(b) and (c) of the Directive, assessing in 
particular whether there are significant inconsistencies in the transposition. The article 
moves on to discuss whether the Member States have introduced ‘effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive’ criminal penalties for the implementation of the waste 
offences, as required under Article 5 of the Directive. This could provide the basis for 
the Commission to bring infringement proceedings against specific Member States or 
to advance the case for further harmonisation of environmental criminal law in the 
EU. The article then discusses the extent to which the Directive could affect 
prosecutorial discretion by requiring national authorities in the Member States to 
apply criminal penalties for violations of environmental offences in individual cases. 
The article ends with concluding remarks summarizing the main findings.
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF WASTE OFFENCES IN THE EU
Following a major inter-institutional dispute over the correct legal basis for the EU to 
legislate in environmental criminal matters (see the Environmental Crimes21 and Ship-
Source Pollution cases22), a Directive proposal was presented by the European 
Commission in February 2007 for the harmonization of environmental criminal law.23 
The Environmental Crime Directive was finally adopted unanimously by the Council 
15 European Environment Agency (EEA), Waste without Borders in the EU? Transboundary Waste 
Shipments of Waste (EEA, 2009), at 5.
16 See Europol, n. 9 above.
17 Directive 2002/96/EC of 27 January 2003 on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE), 
[2003] OJ L37/24; and the recast Directive 2012/19/EU of 4 July 2012 on Waste Electrical and 
Electronic Equipment (WEEE), [2012] OJ L197/38.
18 See EnviCrimeNet, ‘Report on Environmental Crime’ (2016), at 16, found at: 
<http://www.envicrimenet.eu/EN/images/docs/envicrimenet%20report%20on%20environmental%20cr
ime.pdf>; and European Union Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental 
Law (IMPEL), ‘IMPEL-TFS Enforcement Actions II: Enforcement of EU Waste Shipment Regulation’ 
(28 April 2011), found at: 
<https://www.politieacademie.nl/kennisenonderzoek/kennis/mediatheek/PDF/81477.pdf>.
19 ‘Trafigura found Guilty of Exporting Toxic Waste’, BBC News (23 July 2010).
20 Environmental Crime Directive, n. 10 above.
21 ECJ, Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council, [2005] ECR. I-7879 (‘Environmental Crimes’).
22 ECJ, Case C-440/05, Commission v. Council, [2007] ECR I-9097 (‘Ship-Source Pollution’).
23 Proposal for a Directive of 9 February 2007 on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal 
Law, COM(2007) 51 (‘2007 Environmental Crime Directive Proposal’).
on 24 October 2008. The Commission argued that harmonization of environmental 
criminal law could help improve the implementation deficit of EC environmental 
legislation and provide a strong deterrent against environmental crimes within the EU.
24 However, the provisions on the minimum levels of maximum penalties, which were 
present in the original directive proposal were dropped in the final text, in line with 
the ECJ ruling in the Ship-Source Pollution case.25
Most Member States have implemented the Environmental Crime Directive by either 
amending their existing criminal and/or environmental legislation.26 The choice of 
implementation of the Directive under national penal codes is consistent with the 
legislative practice in some Member States. Indeed, long before the adoption of the 
Directive, many EU Member States introduced into their penal codes specific 
provisions on the protection of the environment.27 Following the example of the 
German Strafgezetzbuch of 1980, an amendment to which introduced a chapter 
entitled ‘Crimes against the Environment’,28 Austria (1977/1997),29 Spain (1996),30 
Portugal (1995),31 as well as Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden have 
incorporated environmental offences into their penal codes.32 Some Member States 
have partially reformed their penal codes to incorporate, among others, environmental 
crimes – for example Austria and Sweden – while others have undertaken total reform 
of their penal codes – for example Portugal, Spain and Finland.33 
Following the transposition deadline of the EU Environmental Crime Directive on 26 
December 2010, all Member States were required to have reformed their national 
laws to incorporate environmental offences and criminal penalties. Countries such as 
Austria34 and Germany35 adopted federal legislation amending their criminal codes in 
response. By contrast, the United Kingdom and Ireland – which do not have a 
24 Ibid., recital 4.
25 Compare, for example, European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs, Report on the Proposal for 
a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of the Environment 
through Criminal Law (15 April 2008), found at: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A6-2008-
0154+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN>; and the several Reports of the Council Working Party on Substantive 
Criminal Law, e.g.: Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Directive on the Protection of the 
Environment through Criminal Law (10 March 2008), found at: 
<http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6916-2008-INIT/en/pdf>.
26 R. Pereira, Environmental Criminal Liability and Enforcement in European and International Law 
(Brill, 2015), at 158.
27 See M. Faure, ‘The Development of Environmental Criminal Law in the EU and Its Member States’, 
26:2 Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law (2017).
28 German Criminal Code (Strafrechtsanderungsgesetz (StSG)) of July 1980, reformed by the 31 StAG 
of 1 November 1994.
29 Austrian Penal Code (Strafrechtsanderungsgesetz (StGB)), Federal Act of 23 January 1974, BGBI. 
Nr. 60/1974. See C. Ringelmann, ‘Recent Trends in Environmental Criminal Legislation’, 5:4 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (1997), 393.
30 Spanish Criminal Code (Nuevo Codigo Penal), Law 10/1995, Articles 325-331.
31 Portuguese Criminal Code (‘Codigo Penal’), Law Decree 48/95, Articles 278-281.
32 N. de Sadeleer, ‘La Répression des Infractions en Matière de Gestion des Déchets’, in: F. Comte and 
L. Kramer (eds.), Environmental Crimes in Europe: Rules of Sanctions (Europa Law Publishing, 
2004), 65.
33 See C. Ringelmann, n. 29 above, at 395.
34 Austrian Federal Law (Bundesgesetz), BGBI.I Nr. 130/2011.
35 German Federal Law (Bundesgesetz) No. 64 (2011) Part I.
criminal code – instead amended specific pieces of national environmental legislation.
36
There are two waste offences under the Environmental Crime Directive: the illegal 
collection, disposal, transport or recovery of waste (Article 3(b)) and the illegal 
shipment of waste (Article 3(c)). As will be discussed further below, there are two 
main reasons for the ‘splitting’ of the waste criminal offences under the Directive. 
They are the fact that those offences aim to improve the enforcement of different 
pieces of EU environmental legislation; and the different degrees of endangerment to 
the environment or human health required for establishment of each of the offences. 
This approach to harmonization of waste offences also reflects the fact that the 
European Community (i.e., pre-Lisbon) was recognized to have powers to harmonize 
environmental criminal law only if linked to ensuring the effective implementation of 
EC environmental law.37
The analysis of the transposition of the illegal waste management and trafficking 
offences under the Environmental Crime Directive will be made, in particular, with 
reference to the findings of a study carried out by the consultancy Milieu, published in 
late 2015.38
UNLAWFUL COLLECTION, TRANSPORT, RECOVERY OR DISPOSAL OF 
WASTE
The waste offence under Article 3(b) of the Environmental Crime Directive aims to 
improve the enforcement of specific EU waste disposal and treatment directives. 
There are over fourteen EU waste-related directives listed in Annex A of the 
Environmental Crime Directive, violations of which must be criminalized by the 
Member States when they meet the legal threshold set in Article 3(b). This offence is 
more specific than under the original proposal for the Directive presented by the 
European Commission on February 2007.39 Whereas under the latter Member States 
needed to criminalize the unlawful ‘treatment, including disposal and storage, 
transport, [export or import of waste], including hazardous waste’,40 the former 
requires criminalization of the unlawful ‘collection, transport, recovery or disposal of 
waste, including the supervision of such operations and the after-care disposal sites, 
and including action taken as a dealer or broker (waste management)’.41 Despite the 
deletion of ‘including hazardous waste’ in the final text of the Directive, the broader 
concept of ‘waste’ under Article 3(b) and 3(c) of the Directive includes also 
hazardous wastes. Moreover, Article 3(b) does not refer to the ‘export and import’, 
36 See R. Pereira n. 26 above, at 158.
37 Ship-Source Pollution, n. 22 above, at paragraph 66.
38 See the national reports of the Evaluation Study on the Implementation of Directive 2008/99/EC on 
the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law by Member States, found at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/criminal-law-policy/environmental- protection/index_en.htm>. To 
date, the Commission has published 25 national reports of the study. The Commission has refused to 
disclose the remaining three reports, as it is currently taking infringement actions against three Member 
States (France, Germany and Hungary). It has also refused to publish the general report pending 
resolution of the ongoing infraction disputes.
39 See 2007 Environmental Crime Directive Proposal, n. 23 above, at 3.
40 Ibid., Article 3(c).
41 Environmental Crime Directive, n. 10 above, Article 3(b).
because these activities are addressed in the separate offence of illegal waste shipment 
offence contained in Article 3(c).
The Member States have not consistently transposed the elements of the illegal waste 
management offence under the Directive. While some national transposition measures 
could be regarded as incomplete because they adopt a lower standard than required in 
the Directive, other national implementation measures apply higher standards than 
prescribed under the Directive. Indeed, several Member States did not transpose the 
offence under Article 3(b) to include all the operations such as ‘collection, transport, 
recovery or disposal of waste, including the supervision of such operations and the 
after-care disposal sites, and including action taken as a dealer or broker (waste 
management’,42 but instead have transposed that provision or maintained a national 
law provision using broader, all-encompassing notions. For example, the Austrian 
implementing legislation refers to ‘waste collector’ (which it has been suggested is 
broader than actions of a dealer or a broker).43 The Portuguese implementation 
legislation adopts a higher standard by also referring to the ‘storage, sorting and 
treatment’ of waste.44 The Cypriot implementation legislation does not refer to ‘action 
taken as a dealer or a broker (waste management)’ but it covers more broadly 
‘action[s] taken by persons during waste management’.45 The Polish implementation 
legislation, in addition to transport and recovery, covers ‘the storage, removal 
(including collection) and processing of waste,’ and therefore has a more 
comprehensive coverage than the Directive.46 Moreover, the Dutch waste crime 
legislation does not explicitly describe all operations mentioned in the Directive but 
instead refers to ‘anybody that acts or fails to act regarding waste material’,47 which 
appears to be broader than the list of operations under Article 3(b).
In other examples, the national implementation measures could be considered to be 
incomplete and hence in breach of the Directive. The Estonian implementation 
legislation covers ‘the collection, transport, recovery and disposal of waste including 
activities of dealers and brokers’, but it does not explicitly cover ‘the supervision of 
such operations and the aftercare of disposal sites’.48 The scope of Estonian 
legislation is thus narrower than the Directive.49 Another example is the Swedish 
42 Ibid.
43 Milieu, ‘National Report for Austria, Evaluation Study on the Implementation of Directive 
2008/99/EC on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law by Member States’ (Milieu, 
2015) (‘National Report for Austria’).
44 Milieu, ‘National Report for Portugal, Evaluation Study on the Implementation of Directive 
2008/99/EC on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law by Member States’ (Milieu, 
2015) (‘National Report for Portugal’).
45 Milieu, ‘National Report for Cyprus, Evaluation Study on the Implementation of Directive 
2008/99/EC on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law by Member States’ (Milieu, 
2015) (‘National Report for Cyprus’).
46 Milieu, ‘National Report for Poland, Evaluation Study on the Implementation of Directive 
2008/99/EC on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law by Member States’ (Milieu, 
2015) (‘National Report for Poland’).
47 Milieu, ‘National Report for the Netherlands, Evaluation Study on the Implementation of Directive 
2008/99/EC on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law by Member States’ (Milieu, 
2015) (‘National Report for the Netherlands’).
48 Milieu, ‘National Report for Estonia, Evaluation Study on the Implementation of Directive 
2008/99/EC on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law by Member States’ (Milieu, 
2015) (‘National Report for Estonia’).
49 Under Article 6.2 of the Environmental Crime Directive, n. 10 above, the lack of supervision may be 
sufficient to establish the (criminal, administrative or civil) liability of legal persons.
implementing law, which could be regarded as incomplete since the ‘unlawful 
collection of waste’ is not covered by any criminal liability under national law.50 It 
remains to be seen whether the Commission will regard those transposition breaches 
to be sufficiently serious to bring infringement proceedings against those individual 
Member States.
As is the case with most other offences under the Directive, the illegal waste disposal 
offence under Article 3(b) is a ‘concrete endangerment’ offence, as it requires that a 
certain minimum damage threshold is met, i.e. that it may cause or is likely to cause 
death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to the quality of air, the 
quality of soil or the quality of water, or to animals or plants.51 Therefore, the 
minimum standard is that of a concrete harm to the environment (or significant risk of 
causing harm) and an abstract endangerment is not sufficient to establish an offence. 
Since it is the administrative agency that generally establishes permissible pollution 
levels, concrete endangerment offences are defined by a strong interdependency 
between administrative law and criminal law. That is, it will generally be the 
administrative authorities which will set the allowable levels of waste pollution and 
hence what a ‘significant risk of harm’ to the environment or human health is. This 
suggests that there is an ‘absolute dependency’ between environmental law and 
administrative law.52 This interdependency between administrative law and criminal 
law can be problematic from the perspective of assigning liability for environmental 
damage, leading one commentator to argue that the criminal law is inherently 
antithetical to environmental law.53
The use of vague notions of harm such as ‘substantial damage’ and ‘serious injury’ 
under the definition of the Article 3(b) offence can lead to inconsistencies in 
implementation.54 Indeed, the actual level of environmental protection can be 
compromised depending on the judicial interpretation given to such terms, given that 
there is no definition of those terms under the Directive. Those terms would be 
interpreted in light of the traditions and legal system of each Member State.55 It is 
arguable that these undefined notions may be too vague to bring fundamental changes 
in the levels of environmental protection and enforcement in practice.56 One example 
of incorrect implementation is the Dutch Penal Code, which uses more restrictive 
terminology than the Directive by referring to damage to ‘public health’ instead of 
50 Milieu, ‘National Report for Sweden, Evaluation Study on the Implementation of Directive 
2008/99/EC on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law by Member States’ (Milieu, 
2015) (‘National Report for Sweden’).
51 Environmental Crime Directive, n. 10 above, Article 3(f-g)) and Article 3(h).
52 See, e.g., C. Ringelmann, n. 29 above, at 39; M. Faure and M. Visser, ‘How to Punish 
Environmental Pollution? Some Reflections on the Various Models of Criminalisation of 
Environmental Harm’, 3:4 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (1995), 
316; H.-J. Albrecht and S. Leppa, ‘Criminal Law and the Environment’, in: Proceedings of the 
European Seminar held in Lauchhammer, Land Brandenburg, Germany (April 1992).
53 R. Lazarus, ‘Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming 
Environmental Criminal Law’, 83 Georgetown Law Journal (1995), 2407, at 2428.
54 Environmental Crime Directive, n. 10 above, Article 3(a-h).
55 F. Comte, ‘Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law: Destiny of the Various European 
Union’s Initiatives’, in: M. Odina (ed.) Europe and the Environment (Europa Law Publishing, 2004), 
43.
56 L. Krämer, ‘Case Law Analysis: Environment, Crime and EC Law’, 18:2 Journal of Environmental 
Law (2006), 277.
‘serious injury’.57 Some Member States have adopted guidelines which aim to curtail 
the discretion in the interpretation of those undefined notions by national authorities. 
One example is the national implementation by Cyprus which defines the term 
‘substantial damage’ by reference to whether the damage is ‘irreversible,’ ‘partly 
reversible’ or ‘deemed substantial by the Court’.58 Although this appears to be a 
particularly high threshold to define ‘substantial damage’ (given that not all 
‘substantial damage’ is ‘irreversible’ or ‘partly [ir]reversible’), it illustrates how the 
discretion of national judges and public authorities can be limited through the 
adoption of national guidelines. In the UK, the Sentencing Council adopted 
sentencing guidelines in 2014 for the offence of ‘unauthorised or harmful deposit, 
treatment or disposal … of waste’ committed by organizations or individuals.59 The 
sentencing guidelines link the level of criminal penalties to the actual or potential 
harm caused by waste offences, as well as the culpability of the offender.60
As the EU Environmental Crime Directive only imposes minimum standards,61 it 
allows Member States to adopt higher standards and criminalize even less serious 
activities which do not cause or are likely to cause ‘substantial damage’, ‘serious 
injury’ or ‘significant deterioration’.62 This suggests that Member States may adopt 
higher standards of environmental protection and require a lower threshold to 
establish liability for environmental damage than is required under Article 3(b).63 
Therefore, those terms do not need to be transposed literally into national law, as long 
as the standard adopted is equal or higher than that under the Directive (for example, 
the terms ‘damage’ or ‘injury’ could be transposed without the ‘substantial’ or 
‘serious’ thresholds). This can be seen for example in the Irish implementation 
legislation according to which any person may be guilty of a criminal offence even 
where substantial environmental damage does not follow from the conduct.64 If a 
Member State adopts or maintains more stringent standards than the Directive, under 
Article 193 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), it is 
required to notify the Commission and such measures must be compatible with the 
Treaties.65
ÍLLEGAL WASTE SHIPMENT
57 See National Report for the Netherlands, n. 47 above.
58 Cypriot Law 22(I)/2012, Article 5. See National Report for Cyprus, n. 45 above.
59 In the context of illegal waste disposal in Northern Ireland, see C. Brennan, ‘The Enforcement of 
Waste Law in Northern Ireland: Deterrence, Dumping and the Dynamics of Devolution’, 28:3 Journal 
of Environmental Law (2016), 471.
60 Sentencing Council, ‘Environmental Offences: Definite Guidelines’ (2014).
61 This is in light of the legal basis used for the adoption of the Directive Article 192 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, [2012] OJ C326/47 (‘TFEU’)). See also Environmental Crime Directive, n. 10 above, 
recital 12.
62 Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal 
Law, Impact Assessment, COM(2007) 51, SEC(2007) 161 (‘Impact Assessment’), at 35.
63 Regulation 1013/2006, n. 12 above, was adopted on the basis of former Article 175 of the EC Treaty 
(now Article 192 TFEU, n. 61 above), thus allowing Member States to enhance those standards.
64 Milieu, ‘National Report for Ireland, Evaluation Study on the Implementation of Directive 
2008/99/EC on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law by Member States’ (Milieu, 
2015) (‘National Report for Ireland’).
65 TFEU, n. 61 above, Article 193 TFEU.
The illegal waste shipment offence in Article 3(c) of the Directive aims to improve 
the enforcement of Regulation 1013/2006 on shipments of waste, which itself 
implements the EU Member States’ obligations under the Basel Convention.66 The 
illegal shipment of waste contrary to the 2006 Waste Shipment Regulation67 includes 
the shipment carried out without the notification or consent of the competent 
authorities.68 In 2014, amendments to the Waste Shipment Regulation69 were adopted 
to achieve more consistent implementation throughout the EU.70 By 1 January 2017, 
Member States needed to have established inspection plans; and these plans must 
include the objectives and priorities of the inspections, the geographical area covered 
by the inspection plans and the tasks assigned to each authority involved.71
Article 50 of the Waste Shipment Regulation requires Member States to introduce 
‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ penalties for the implementation of that 
Regulation as well as to take specific enforcement measures against illegal waste 
shipment, such as ‘inspections’ and ‘spot checks’.72 Yet the Regulation itself does not 
require the criminalization of waste shipment offences and does not impose criminal 
penalties on operators. This is unsurprising, given that the Regulation was adopted in 
2006 when there was still uncertainty as to the extent of the EU’s criminal law powers 
under the first pillar. So although one of the corollaries of the direct applicability of 
an EU regulation is that it may affect individuals directly without the need for taking 
implementing measures at the national level,73 the penalties (including criminal 
penalties) for the violation of the Regulation require transposition at the national 
level, in line with the principle of legality.74
Unlike the illegal waste management offence under Article 3(b), the illegal waste 
shipment offence under Article 3(c) of the Environmental Crime Directive is an 
abstract endangerment offence, so no specific level of environmental harm is required 
for the establishment of a criminal offence. It is one of only two abstract 
endangerment offences present in the Directive.75 This cautious approach to 
criminalization of abstract endangerment offences is in line with the Council of 
Justice and Home Affairs’ 2009 model provisions on criminal offences, which 
suggest that EU criminal legislation, as a general rule, should refrain from 
criminalizing an abstract danger.76 Abstract endangered offences involve technical or 
formal infringements including violations of the terms of a permit (e.g., failure to 
66 As discussed above, the European Communities became a party to the Basel Convention on 7 
February1994.
67 Regulation 1013/2006, n. 12 above.
68 Article 3(c) of the Environmental Crime Directive, n. 10 above, refers to Article 2.35 of Regulation 
1013/2006, n. 12 above.
69 Regulation 660/2014 of 15 May 2014 Amending Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 on Shipments of 
Waste, [2014] OJ L189/135.
70 C. Gerstetter et al., ‘Synthesis of the Research Project “European Union Action to Fight 
Environmental Crime”, Environmental Crime and the EU’ (2016), found at: 
<http://efface.eu/sites/default/files/publications/EFFACE_synthesis-report_final_online.pdf>, at 26.
71 Ibid.
72 Regulation 1013/2006, n. 12 above, Article 50.2.
73 T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) at 420.
74 Regulation 1013/2006, n. 12 above, Articles 2.35 and Article 50.2.
75 See further R. Pereira n. 26 above. See also Environmental Crime Directive, n. 10 above, Article 
3(h).
76 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Model Provisions Guiding the Council’s 
Criminal Law Deliberations (30 November 2009), at paragraph 4.
supply monitoring reports to the competent authority) or carrying out an activity 
without a permit (which need not cause any environmental damage).77 The mere 
violation of the permit, or carrying out the activity without one, is sufficient for the 
commission of the offence. This is why abstract endangerment offences are 
sometimes called ‘formal offences’: they incriminate conduct which is potentially 
dangerous, independently of the result or likelihood of the result.78 Those offences 
generally aim to protect the interests of the administrative authority in the proper 
enforcement of environmental law (the environment being protected indirectly).79 Yet 
although the main rationale behind these offences is to serve the interests of the 
administration in controlling the industrial activity, there is a presumption that an 
intolerable endangerment to the environment has occurred.80 Thus in potentially 
serious cases of abstract endangerment to the environment, the economic activity 
carried out without a permit may constitute not only an administrative infringement, 
but also a crime.81
It is questionable whether the Environmental Crime Directive should have 
criminalized an abstract endangerment such as in the case of illegal waste shipment. 
In particular, the Council of Justice and Home Affairs’ 2009 model provisions suggest 
that only exceptionally such offences should be criminalized in EU criminal law 
instruments.82 Moreover, the (annulled) 2003 Council Framework Decision on 
environmental crime did not aim to criminalize illegal waste shipment as an abstract 
endangerment, although it criminalized the ‘import and export’ of waste linked to a 
specific level of environmental damage.83 Still, a strong case for criminalization of 
illegal waste shipment at the EU level can be made on the basis of the transnational 
impacts of this offence (including the trafficking of hazardous wastes to developing 
countries) and to give effect to the Basel Convention’s enforcement provisions 
requiring the criminalization and punishment of such offences.84 Moreover, illegal 
waste shipment is regarded as a particularly serious offence by the enforcement 
authorities of some Member States and EU criminal law cooperation bodies.85
Another area in which there are discrepancies in implementation of the Environmental 
Crime Directive relates to the requirement under Article 3(c) for criminalization of 
waste shipment in ‘non-negligible’ quantities. Some Member States, like Portugal, 
77 Milieu and Huglo Lepage ‘Summary Report: Study on Measures other than Criminal Ones in Cases 
where Environmental Community Law has not been Respected in the EU Member States’ (2004) 
(‘Study on Non-criminal Measures’), at  
<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/crime/pdf/report_environmental_crime.pdf>, at 21.
78 S. Dandachi, ‘Convention sur la Protection de L’Environnement,’ 28:3 Revue Juridique de 
L’Environnement (2003), 281, at 284.
79 See M. Faure and M. Visser, n. 52 above, at 320.
80 See Study on Non-criminal Measures’, n. 77 above, at 20.
81 Ibid., at 21.
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83 Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA of 5 February 2003 on the Protection of the Environment through 
Criminal Law, [2003] OJ L29/55, Article 2(c).
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85 See, e.g., Europol, n. 9 above; and National Report for Poland, n. 46 above.
introduced the requirement of criminalization of waste shipments with reference to 
the quantitative element (‘non-negligible quantity’) and thus reproduced the wording 
of Article 3(c).86 Yet even when literally transposing the wording of Article 3(c), the 
national implementation laws of the Member States in general do not specify how 
‘non-negligible quantity’ is to be determined. This means that this concept must be 
determined by national judges and public authorities on a case-by-case basis. The 
effect is that the national enforcement authorities in some Member States will be more 
tolerant regarding illegal waste shipment in negligible quantities than others.
In other instances, the national implementation legislation of some Member States has 
adopted a broader scope than the Directive by also criminalizing the shipment of 
waste in ‘negligible quantities’. For example, the Irish law transposing the Waste 
Shipment Regulation provides for criminal sanctions without transposition of the 
condition that the shipment be undertaken in a non-negligible quantity, which means 
that under Irish law a person could be prosecuted for illegal shipment of waste in 
negligible quantities.87 Similarly, neither the Cypriot, Polish or Swedish 
implementation laws refer to waste shipment in a specified quantity, and hence waste 
shipment in negligible quantities could be subject to criminal penalties in those 
Member States.88
Those national implementation measures are not in breach of the Environmental 
Crime Directive, as it only imposes minimum standards, thus leaving discretion to the 
Member States regarding the choice of criminalizing waste shipment in negligible 
quantities.89 Alternatively, it could be argued that the Directive has direct effect on 
Member States,90 and therefore that it allows individuals to rely on their rights under 
the Directive, potentially providing the basis for a defence for waste shipment 
operators and others facing criminal prosecutions for illegal waste shipment in 
negligible quantities. This question may be put before the Court of Justice of the EU 
(CJEU) to clarify whether the ‘attenuating circumstances’ for certain offences in the 
Directive – such as the ‘non-negligible quantity’ of waste shipment in Article 3(c) – 
could entail direct effects. These ‘attenuating circumstances’ could be claimed by 
defendants in criminal proceedings raising the retroactivity of the more beneficial 
Union criminal legislation. Indeed, the CJEU has shown willingness to foster 
application of the principle of retroactivity of the more beneficial EU legislation in the 
legal systems of the Member States.91 Yet it would be difficult for waste shipment 
operators to argue that that qualifying element provides a specific right to individuals 
or corporations, given that the Directive creates minimum standards only, allowing 
the Member States to go beyond the EU standards. Moreover, since the obligations 
under the Directive are aimed at the Member States to create criminal offences and to 
introduce ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ penalties which are connected to 
86 See National Report for Portugal, n. 44 above.
87 See National Report for Ireland, n. 64 above. Yet the Irish national law expert has noted that ‘it is 
perhaps unlikely that a prosecutor would prosecute in that context’. Ibid., at 21.
88 See National Report for Poland, n. 46 above; National Report for Sweden, n. 50 above; and National 
Report for Cyprus, n. 45 above.
89 See TFEU, n. 61 above, Article 192; see also Environmental Crime Directive, n. 10 above, recital 
12.
90 ECJ, Cases C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos, [1963] ECLI:EU:C:1963:1; C-91/92 Paola Faccine Dori, 
[1994] ECLI:EU:C:1994:292; C-38/77 Enka, [1997] ECLI:EU:C:1977:190; C-190/87 Moorman, 
[1987] ECLI:EU:C:1993:206.
91 ECJ, Cases C-358/93 and C-416/93, Bordessa [1995] ECLI:EU:C:1995:54.
existing rights and obligations under EU environmental law, it would be difficult for 
illegal waste shipment operators or criminal organizations to establish that the 
Directive creates any additional rights to individuals or that it entails direct effects.92
TOWARDS ‘EFFECTIVE, PROPORTIONATE AND DISSUASIVE’ 
CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL OFFENCES IN THE EU?
The Environmental Crime Directive requires Member States to introduce ‘effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive’ criminal penalties, but it does not prescribe specific 
types and levels of criminal penalties.93 This can be explained by the fact that the 
Ship-Source Pollution ruling had denied the (then) European Community the power to 
prescribe specific types and levels of criminal penalties.94 As will be discussed in this 
and the subsequent section, this is a significant limitation that could compromise the 
effective implementation of the Directive in the Member States. This section aims to 
assess the extent to which significant differences remain as regards the choice of types 
and levels of criminal penalties for the waste offences in the Member States following 
the adoption of the Directive.
Prior to the adoption of the Environmental Crime Directive in 2008, a study on 
environmental crime in the EU-27 Member States95 suggested that there were 
considerable differences as regards the types and levels of penalties for the specific 
offences envisaged in the 2007 Directive proposal. As regards the offence of illegal 
waste shipment, some Member States provided for a prison sanction for this offence 
only where the act concerned hazardous waste96 and/or only if it led to environmental 
damage.97 When environmental damage was caused, the prison penalty could be high 
(up to 7-8 years).98 The lowest prison sentence for this offence was applied in 
Luxembourg (from eight days to six months). As regards legal persons, the study 
suggested that there were significant differences regarding the maximum levels of 
fines applied. The lowest criminal fines for this offence were applied in Portugal and 
Bulgaria99 and the highest were present in Ireland and Estonia.100 Other Member 
States only applied administrative penalties101 or no fine at all.102
After the adoption of the Directive and its transposition deadline ended in 26 
December 2010, important differences remained as regards the choices of types and 
levels of criminal penalties applied for transposition of the waste offences in the 
directive. As regards the illegal waste management offence in Article 3(b), the 
Spanish transposition legislation imposes upon natural persons a sanction of 
92 See also R. Pereira n. 26 above, at 159-160. See, e.g., ECJ, Case C-168/95 Criminal Proceedings 
against Luciano Arcaro, [1996] ECLI:EU:C:1996:363, at paragraph 37.
93 Environmental Crime Directive, n. 10 above, Article 6.
94 Ship-Source Pollution, n. 22 above, at paragraph 70.
95 See Study on Non-criminal Measures’, n. 77 above.
96 Czech Republic, Estonia and Latvia. Ibid.
97 Greece, Spain, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia. Ibid.
98 Ibid., at 10.
99 Maximum of €3,000 and €5000 respectively. Ibid.
100 Maximum of €15,000,000 and €16,000,000. Ibid.
101 Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, Sweden. Austria has the lowest maximum fine (€7,270). 
Ibid.
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imprisonment between one and two years.103 The Polish implementation of Article 
3(b) applies a sanction of deprivation of liberty for a term between three months and 
five years, when the offence committed intentionally; and a fine or a sanction of 
restriction of freedom or sanction of deprivation of liberty for a term up to two years, 
for the offence committed unintentionally.104 In Sweden, the criminal sanctions that 
apply to natural persons for the offence under Article 3(b) are a fine or term of 
imprisonment not exceeding two years; and if the offence is serious, a term of 
imprisonment between six months and six years.105 The Swedish maximum fine for 
natural persons for all offences described in Article 3 of the Directive is €17,250, 
although higher levels of maximum criminal fines (of 10,000,000 Swedish Kronor 
(SEK), or around €1million) are foreseen for legal persons.106
The criminal penalties introduced by the Member States for implementation of the 
illegal waste shipment offence under Article 3(c) of the Directive are generally lower 
than for the illegal waste disposal offence under Article 3(b), which reflects the fact 
that the waste shipment offence is an abstract endangerment offence. The Estonian 
legislation implementing the Directive107 criminalizes the illegal transboundary waste 
shipment ‘in significant quantities’ with an (unspecified) pecuniary penalty for legal 
persons or up to one year of imprisonment for individuals.108 The Austrian 
implementing legislation109 criminalizes illegal waste shipments ‘in large quantities’ 
by up to one year imprisonment or a fine of up to 360 daily rates110 (a lower penalty 
applies to grossly negligent offences).111 The Swedish implementation legislation 
applies a fine or term of imprisonment not exceeding two years for the same offence.
112
Since the Directive only adopts minimum standards, it was to be expected that there 
would be a degree of variation in the choices of types and levels of criminal penalties. 
Therefore, the inconsistencies in implementation of the directive may not in 
themselves be a sufficient basis for the Commission to institute Article 258 TFEU 
infringement proceedings or to establish a case for further harmonization of 
environmental criminal law in the EU.
Yet a case can be made that the inconsistencies in implementation of the offences and 
penalties under the Directive would allow certain Member States to become ‘pollution 
havens’ due to lax environmental regulation and enforcement.113 The Commission 
103 Milieu, ‘National Report for Spain, Evaluation Study on the Implementation of Directive 
2008/99/EC on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law by Member States’ (2015).
104 National Report for Poland n. 46 above.
105 National Report for Sweden, n. 50 above.
106 Ibid.
107 Estonian Penal Code (Karistusseadustik) RT I (2001), as amended by RT I (2011), in force on 21 
March 2011.
108 Ibid., at § 368.1-2.
109 Austrian Federal Law, n. 34 above.
110 The level of payment in relation to one daily unit depends on various circumstances, for instance the 
income of the perpetrator, obligations to dependents and others. Pursuant to § 19.2 of the Austrian 
Penal Code, n. 29 above, one daily unit is minimum €4 and maximum €5,000. See National Report for 
Austria, n. 43 above.
111 Ibid.
112 National Report for Sweden, n. 50 above.
113 See also M. Hedemann-Robinson, Enforcement of European Union Environmental Law: Legal 
Issues and Challenges (Routledge, 2007), at 517.
suggests that the diversity of national penal systems allows criminals to select the 
system that is regarded as least effective and use it as a safe haven.114 The existing 
legal diversity between legal systems could thus constitute a ‘weapon’ in the hands of 
criminals. Modern technical means of communications allow criminals to choose at a 
distance where to commit certain types of offences according to the standard of 
incrimination and level of penalties.115
The Commission also links the types of offences and penalties to internal market 
integration, arguing that differences in national sanctions may impact on the costs of 
non-compliance with environmental regulations and hence distort competition.116 It is 
suggested that penalties that vary in nature (administrative or criminal) or severity 
(fine or imprisonment) can create distortions in the application of the underlying rules 
and even distort competition.117 Moreover, the Commission suggests that businesses 
established in certain Member States with low levels of criminalization and penalties 
are placed in a competitive advantage in relation to their competitors based in other 
Member States with more stringent liability regimes, as they may violate certain rules 
without risking the costs of fines or other criminal sanctions.118 
Although, in general, it appears to be correct to suggest that the creation of a level 
playing field could erase certain distortions in competition connected to the lax 
enforcement of environmental law in some Member States, it would be difficult to 
support market integration alone as a justification for criminalization and 
harmonization of criminal penalties in the EU member states. The Court of Justice 
emphasized in the Tobacco Advertising case that the EU could not rely on the need to 
eliminate distortions of competition in the tobacco advertisement or sale sectors for 
adoption of that measure, since the lawfulness of a Directive based on Article 114 
TFEU is dependent on whether the distortions of competition which the measure 
purports to eliminate are appreciable.119 Moreover, existing studies have suggested 
that stringent environmental regulations have played a small role in management 
decisions to allocate firms across countries.120 This may be explained by the fact that 
environmental investments are only a small fraction of the total costs of production 
for most firms other than the heavily polluting ones.121 The literature on the 
harmonization of European private law has also criticized harmonization as a 
technical process devoted to market-making for the disregard of the rich and deep 
historical roots of the national laws subject to its influence.122
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122 See, e.g., P. Legrand, ‘On the Unbearable Localness of the Law: Academic Fallacies and 
Unreasonable Observations,’ 10:1 European Review of Private Law (2003), 61, at 66.
A stronger argument could be raised to suggest that the differences in types and levels 
of criminal penalties in the Member States could have a significant impact on their 
deterrent effects.123 However, there are no conclusive criminological studies proving 
the existence of ‘marginal’ deterrence, that is, how much extra deterrence is achieved 
by increasing the severity of penalties by adjusting penalty levels. Indeed, while the 
existence of deterrence arising from the introduction of criminal penalties has been 
tested and confirmed in criminological studies (which is expected to be achieved 
through the criminalization of environmental offences as required under the 
Environmental Crime Directive),124 there is no evidence that manipulating penalty 
levels necessarily lead to higher deterrent effects.125
Another argument to support the case for more stringent environmental criminal 
penalties is the TFEU requirement that the level of environmental protection in the 
EU must be ‘high’.126 Yet it must be noted that the CJEU has consistently held, when 
defining the meaning and extent of the adjective ‘high’ level of environmental 
protection, that it is for the Member States themselves to decide which level of 
environmental protection they consider to be appropriate, taking into account the 
requirements of the free movements of goods.127 
The national reports accompanying the 2015 Milieu study have referred to a range of 
criteria to determine the overall effectiveness of the criminal penalties adopted for 
implementation of the Directive. Some of the criteria most commonly applied aimed 
to compare the penalties for environmental offences with the penalties for other 
(national) crimes;128 the national minimum wage;129 the range of penalties available to 
the national authorities (imprisonment, fines, probation, community services, etc.);130 
and the equivalence between penalties applicable to legal persons with the penalties 
for natural persons.131 But the criterion most commonly applied in the national reports 
was to contrast those penalties with the penalties foreseen under Article 6 of the 
Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA on environmental crimes, which was annulled by 
the Court of Justice on 13 September 2005.132 Unlike the later Commission 2007 
Environmental Crime Directive proposal, that Framework Decision did not prescribe 
detailed levels of criminal penalties for specific environmental offences. Article 5 of 
Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA required Member States to introduce the penalty 
of imprisonment ‘in serious cases’ which ‘must give rise to extradition’,133 and that 
123 See further C. Abott, Enforcing Pollution Control Regulation: Strengthening Sanctions and 
Improving Deterrence (Hart, 2009), at 17.
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(Oxford University Press, 2000) at 47.
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127 A. Ziegler, Trade and Environmental Law in the European Community (Oxford University Press, 
1996), at 84.
128 See, e.g., National Report for Cyprus, n. 45 above.
129 See, e.g., Milieu, ‘National Report for Bulgaria, Evaluation Study on the Implementation of 
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133 See Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA, n. 83 above, Article 5.1.
this penalty ‘may be accompanied’ by other measures.134 More specific types (but not 
levels) of penalties are foreseen under the Framework Decision for legal persons, 
which might have been however of a criminal or non-criminal nature – in recognition 
of the divergent legal traditions in the Member States regarding the attribution of 
criminal liability to corporations.135 In addition, some Member States’ national law 
experts referred to the types and levels of penalties under the (annulled) Framework 
Decision 2005/667/JHA on shipping pollution.136 Although this Framework Decision 
related to the specific offence of shipping pollution, it foresaw more detailed types 
and levels of (prison) sentences based on the culpability of the offender and the 
environmental damage caused by the offence.137
The Spanish national law report noted that the Spanish national transposition measure 
complies with the benchmarks set in Decision 2005/667/JHA.138 Likewise, the Polish 
national law expert noted that the majority of offences covered by the Directive are 
subject to a sanction of imprisonment and that the penalty maximum is over one year 
as was required by the annulled Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA.139 In a similar 
vein, the Swedish and Dutch national law experts suggested that the sanctions set out 
by the annulled Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA correspond to those set 
out by their national laws.140
It is perhaps surprising that most Member States’ national law experts used the 2003 
Framework Decision on environmental crime as a benchmark to define the 
effectiveness of the national implementation measures, as that initiative only foresaw 
very limited harmonization of types and levels of penalties. Moreover, although the 
Framework Decision on shipping pollution foresaw more detailed harmonization of 
types of criminal penalties and levels of prison sentences, that initiative related 
specifically to shipping pollution crimes. Therefore, perhaps a more reliable 
benchmark to define the effectiveness of national criminal penalties is found in the 
2007 Environmental Crime Directive proposal which foresaw not only detailed types, 
but also detailed levels of penalties, including financial penalties applicable to legal 
persons, for specific offences. Indeed, the original 2007 Environmental Crime 
Directive proposal aimed at correcting the disparate approaches in the Member States 
as regards the constitutive elements and level of sanctions applicable for 
environmental offences. That proposal followed broadly the conclusions of the 
European Council meeting in Tampere 1999,141 in which the Council decided to 
follow a four-tier system of penalty levels for EU criminal law.142
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Most Member States interpreted the requirement under Article 5 of the Environmental 
Crime Framework Decision that the offence must give rise to extradition to be ‘a 
maximum of at least one year imprisonment’, which is a reference to the legal 
threshold set under the 2002 Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant 
(EAW).143 Indeed, even though the EAW is based on the principle of mutual 
recognition (or ‘mutual trust’ in the European legal space), the issuing of an EAW is 
only possible (unless the sentence has already been passed)144 for acts punishable in 
the issuing Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention order of at least 12 
months. Therefore, as long as all Member States have criminalized specific 
environmental offences (as required under the Environmental Crime Directive) and 
the issuing State has implemented the offence with a maximum of at least one year 
imprisonment, the operation of the EAW will not be impaired.145 This suggests that 
the national environmental criminal penalties might be regarded to be effective if they 
meet the ‘maximum of at least one year imprisonment’ threshold, at least from the 
perspective of EU criminal-law cooperation. However, a barrier to the operation of 
the EAW (and other mutual recognition instruments) would remain if a Member State 
implements the Directive with a custodial sentence or a detention order of less than 12 
months or with pecuniary penalties only. Although there is some evidence of the 
usefulness of the EAW in environmental cases in practice,146 it has been suggested 
that the EAW has not been used frequently in the context of environmental crime.147 
It is thus questionable whether the ‘maximum of at least one year imprisonment’ is 
indeed an appropriate benchmark to assess the effectiveness of the penalties 
implementing the Environmental Crime Directive.
It could be argued that a system of minimum levels of minimum penalties (allowing 
Member States to introduce higher levels of minimum penalties) would be more 
effective in achieving a level playing field than a system of minimum levels of 
maximum sanctions as envisaged in the 2002 Council conclusions on penalties.148 Yet 
not all Member States recognize a system of minimum penalties within their penal 
systems,149 and a system of minimum levels of minimum penalties was discarded by 
the Member States.150 Therefore, even if a future proposal based on Article 83.2 
TFEU establishes a level playing field detailing criminal penalties for environmental 
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crimes in the EU, there would still be significant variations in the actual sentences 
applied by the judicial authorities of the Member States, as the instrument of 
harmonization would only establish minimum levels of maximum penalties.151 The 
Commission itself considers the approximation of minimum levels of maximum 
sanctions favoured by the Council in adopted Framework Decisions to be insufficient,
152 but it acknowledges that the standardization of all criminal penalties in the 
European Union is ‘neither desirable nor legally feasible’, and that the Member 
States’ criminal law systems ‘have their own internal coherence, and amending 
individual rules without regard for the overall picture would risk generating 
distortions’.153 Moreover, the concerns of some Member States and two Advocate 
Generals expressed in the Environmental Crimes154 and Ship-Source Pollution cases
155 regarding the consistency and coherence of the Member States’ internal penal 
systems need to be given due consideration if the Commission is to propose a new EU 
legislative proposal aimed at harmonizing criminal penalties for environmental 
offences based on Article 83.2 TFEU.
It is also paramount that a future amendment to the Environmental Crime Directive is 
consistent with the principles of necessity, proportionality and effectiveness of EU 
law.156 This would require the Commission to demonstrate that the penalties 
introduced by the Member States for implementation of the Directive fail to comply 
with the ‘effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasive’ requirement under Article 6 of 
the Directive, and, arguably, also that those breaches could not be corrected through 
bringing Article 258 TFEU infringement actions against individual non-complying 
Member States.
TOWARDS EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF CRIMINAL PENALTIES 
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL OFFENCES IN THE MEMBER STATES?
It is generally assumed that improvements in enforcement would also lead to a higher 
degree of deterrence of the underlying rules. If the levels of compliance increase after 
the introduction of a sanction (which may be proven by the stabilization of 
prosecutorial activities or the decrease of reported crimes), it could be argued that the 
sanction is effective. On the other hand, increasing policing will generally lead to 
higher numbers of crimes being detected and possibly more prosecutions, which 
could equally be used to support an argument that the system is effective. Still, there 
are no criminological studies proving conclusively how much extra deterrence is 
achieved by increasing the certainty of punishment (e.g. by improving policing), 
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post-Lisbon.
152 See European Commission, Green Paper of 30 April 2004 on the Approximation, Mutual 
Recognition and Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions in the European Union, COM(2004) 334, at 7.
153 Ibid.
154 Environmental Crimes, n. 21 above, Opinion of Advocate General Colomer delivered on 26 May 
2005, at paragraphs 83-87.
155 Ship-Source Pollution, n. 22 above, Opinion of Advocate General Mazak delivered on 28 June 
2007, at paragraph 103ff.
156 Environmental Crimes, n. 21 above, at paragraph 46; Ship-Source Pollution, n. 22 above, at 
paragraph 67; ECJ Joined Cases C-46 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pecheur, ex p Factortame Ltd, [1996] 
ECLI:EU:C:1996:79 (‘Brasserie du Pecheur’), at paragraph 95.
though current research does indicate that there are consistent and significant negative 
correlations between likelihood of conviction and crime rates.157
Prior to the adoption of Environmental Crime Directive, statistical data reported to the 
Commission by the Member States showed a growing number of illegal waste 
shipments.158 Yet according to a 2009 European Environment Agency report, it is not 
clear whether this represents a real increase in illegal shipments or is due to better 
monitoring.159 When assessing the overall effectiveness of the national measures 
implementing the Directive, several national law experts have noted that there was 
lack of statistical data on environmental law enforcement and the application of 
penalties in practice. For example, the Bulgarian national law expert noted that 
‘Article 83a [of the Bulgarian implementation legislation] is still quite new and there 
is no case- law on its application in relation to environmental crimes’.160 The Cypriot 
national law expert noted that ‘[t]aking into consideration that the transposing 
legislation entered into force very recently, on 23 March 2012, Cypriot Courts have 
not prosecuted criminal cases related to violations of the provisions of this law’161and 
‘thus [it is] difficult to assess the effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness of 
the sanctions applied for natural persons’.162
Moreover, some national law experts in the Milieu study have identified a number of 
deficiencies in environmental (criminal) law enforcement in practice. For example, it 
was suggested that the Swedish judges are reluctant to impose severe sentences for 
environmental crimes as they are not considered as equally serious as other types of 
crimes, such as economic crimes or tax evasion.163 Furthermore, the Polish national 
law expert stressed that ‘the implementation of the transposing provisions in practice 
is poor’ and that ‘out of the numerous environmental cases notified to the prosecutor’s 
office (mainly concerning illegal transboundary shipment of waste notified by 
relevant administrative authorities), only very few of them go to the criminal court’.
164 As regards the prosecution of legal persons it was noted that in Poland ‘the main 
problem with the effectiveness of the legal person’s liability is that the LCEA 
[Liability of Collective Entities Act] is not used in practice’.165 The Estonian national 
law expert suggested that ‘the imposition of administrative sanctions clearly prevails’
166 and that the ‘general tendency of Estonian criminal policy is to make little use of 
criminal sanctions, as these are considered ultima ratio and are therefore applied only 
in exceptional cases’.167 The Spanish national law expert presented a more detailed 
(and equally disappointing) account of enforcement practices based on the 2010 
157 See A. Von Hirsch, n. 124 above, at 47.
158 See EEA, n. 15 above, at 4.
159 Ibid.
160 See National Report for Bulgaria, n. 129 above, at 30.
161 See National Report for Cyprus, n. 45 above, at 19.
162 Ibid.
163 See National Report for Sweden, n. 50 above.
164 See National Report for Poland, n. 46 above, at 29.
165 Ibid., at 32. See Polish Liability of Collective Entities for Acts Prohibited under a Threat of a 
Punishment Act (OJ 197, item 1661 as amended).
166 See National Report for Estonia, n. 48 above.
167 Ibid.
annual report of the office of the State prosecutor responsible for environmental 
crimes.168
Could the Environmental Crime Directive address those deficiencies in the 
application of criminal penalties for environmental offences in the Member States? 
Prior to the adoption of the Directive, there was academic debate on whether Member 
States were required under the original directive proposals not only to introduce 
criminal sanctions for serious violations of EC environmental law, but also to apply 
them in individual cases.169 The 2007 Environmental Crime Directive proposal stated 
that ‘Member States shall ensure that the commission of the offences referred to in 
Articles 3 and 4 is punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal 
sanctions’,170 which seemed to allow for flexible implementation by Member States 
regarding the choice of applying either administrative or criminal sanctions in 
individual cases. This provision was maintained in the final text of the Directive,171 
although without specifying the types and levels of penalties. Recital 10 of the 
Directive makes it clear that ‘[the] Directive creates no obligations regarding the 
application of [criminal penalties], or any other available system of law enforcement, 
in individual cases’.172 Thus this should leave no further doubt as to the discretionary 
enforcement powers left to the national authorities in the Member States in individual 
cases.
This flexibility of enforcement in individual cases recognized under the Directive has 
obvious implications for its implementation, and is connected to the question of 
prosecutorial discretion in bringing prosecutions for environmental offences. Most 
EU Member States are governed by the ‘opportunity principle’, and there is no duty to 
prosecute (e.g., Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom).173 The 
prosecution in those countries may decide to be tolerant of minor technical breaches 
of environmental law or when the chances of securing a conviction are low, decide 
that it is not realistic to bring a prosecution.174 It could be argued that the discretion as 
to whether to prosecute may diminish the deterrent levels of the criminal law, and 
could ultimately affect the levels of compliance with environmental regulations if 
prosecutions are rare. Yet this discretion may be limited in some Member States 
168 ‘[B]etween 2009 and 2010, there were a total of 6539 cases having to do broadly with 
environmental protection that led to the initiation of investigations by the state prosecutor. In the same 
two years, 10,788 judicial proceedings were initiated. Of those, only 1,294 led to a conviction, and 526 
to the acquittal of the accused.’ National Report for Spain, n. 103 above, at 28.
169 See M. Faure, ‘European Environmental Criminal Law: Do We Really Need It?, 13:1 European 
Energy and Environmental Law Review (2004), 18; and G. Corstens, ‘Criminal Law in the First Pillar?’ 
11:1 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (2003), 131, at 137, who argued 
that the original proposals required the application of criminal sanctions in individual cases. But see M. 
Lee, EU Environmental Law, Governance and Decision-Making (Hart, 2005), who argued that the 
original proposals did not necessarily require the application of criminal sanctions in individual cases. 
See also R. Pereira, ‘Environmental Criminal Law in the First Pillar: A Positive Development for 
Environmental Protection in the European Union?’, 16:10 European Environmental Law Review 
(2007), 254.
170 2007 Environmental Crime Directive Proposal, n. 23 above, Article 5.1 (emphasis added).
171 Environmental Crime Directive, n. 10 above, Article 5.
172 Ibid., recital 10 (emphasis added).
173 M. Faure, and G. Heine, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Law in the European Union 
(Kluwer, 2005).
174 Ibid., at 82.
which allow the victim to bring an appeal against a decision of the public prosecutor 
not to prosecute.175
Moreover, the ‘compliance strategy’ applied by some environmental agencies in the 
Member States may be too weak to provide sufficient deterrent against environmental 
crimes. Indeed, the strategy of offering companies ‘two carrots before showing the 
stick’ has only marginal deterrent effect since all a polluter risks after detection is that 
it will have to make the investments (e.g., on abatement technology) it was required to 
make anyway.176 It has been suggested that in some EU Member States there is a 
tendency for the authorities to negotiate with the perpetrator for too long before the 
administrative sanction is actually applied.177 It is further suggested that a decision to 
bring infringement proceedings is often subject to considerations of political, 
economic or social interests. Thus, the negotiations between the administration and 
industry can be excessively long and the administrative law enforcement is more with 
the view of achieving compliance than on sanctioning with a deterrence perspective.
The deterrent effects of criminal sanctions could be substantially impaired by these 
flexible approaches to environmental enforcement, even if they could ultimately lead 
to more immediate benefits to the environment through the company’s compliance, 
for instance if the company is compelled to invest in abatement technology or to 
restore the environmental damage.178 Yet even though the prosecution and 
enforcement agencies may apply compliance strategies before deciding whether or 
not to prosecute in some Member States, the practice in some jurisdictions appears to 
show that the prosecution may have limited discretionary powers to use 
administrative penalties when individuals and companies clearly breach a criminal 
rule.179 Moreover, in some countries the administrative agencies are under a legal 
duty to inform the prosecutor about serious cases of pollution amounting to a crime.
180 This certainly curtails the degree of discretion of the administrative authorities. 
However, the possibility of negotiation is not exclusive to the administrative 
procedure and plea bargaining is commonly accepted in the criminal procedures of 
some Member States.181 Another example of flexible prosecutorial law enforcement is 
the deferred prosecution agreement implemented by the Serious Fraud Office and 
Crown Prosecution Service in the UK.182
Notwithstanding the fact the Environmental Crime Directive allows for flexibility in 
national law enforcement in practice, the CJEU has consistently held that the failure 
to prosecute a violation of Union law could constitute a breach of the principle of 
loyal cooperation enshrined in Article 4.3 of the TEU183and that a Member State can 
175 Ibid., at 51.
176 R. Pereira, ‘Compliance and Enforcement in International, European and National Environmental 
Law, in: K. Makuch and R. Pereira (eds.), Environmental and Energy Law (Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 
574; and R. Pereira, n. 26 above.
177 See, e.g., the Dutch report in M. Faure and G. Heine, n. 173 above, at 53.
178 Ibid., at 66.
179 See Study on Non-Criminal Penalties, n. 77 above, at 57; and R. Pereira, n. 26 above.
180 For example, Germany and Belgium. See M. Faure and G. Heine, n. 173 above, at 65.
181 N. Garoupa and F. Stephen, ‘Why Plea-Bargaining Fails to Achieve Results in So Many Criminal 
Justice Systems: A New Framework for Assessment’, 15:3 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law (2008), 323.
182 Schedule 17 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013.
183 Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union, [2012] OJ C326/13.
be challenged before the Court for its failure to prosecute.184 Indeed, the court has 
condemned in several instances a Member State’s failure to prosecute violations of 
EU law as amounting to a violation of the loyal cooperation principle. For instance, in 
Spanish Strawberries, the Court noted that ‘only a very small number of the persons 
who participated in those serious breaches of public order has been identified and 
prosecuted’.185
Hence it would not be inconsistent with the Court’s own case law interpreting the 
loyal cooperation principle enshrined in Article 4.3 TEU, to suggest that the Member 
States are required not only to introduce, but also to apply ‘effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive’ sanctions for the non-compliance with the EU Environmental Crime 
Directive.186
Yet one must be cautious when interpreting those CJEU judgments dealing primarily 
with internal market integration as the basis for a broader interpretation of the loyal 
cooperation principle and for requiring Member States to prosecute environmental 
offences in individual cases. Indeed, the abovementioned cases were decided in light 
of the well-established principles of internal market integration, particularly non-
discrimination and market access, but also the fundamental principle of effectiveness 
of EU law. Although in the more recent Taricco case187 the CJEU ruled that Member 
States must criminalize Value Added Tax fraud on the basis of the principle of loyal 
cooperation,188 this decision recognizes that Member States may apply penalties of a 
non-criminal nature in individual cases and hence it does not override national 
prosecutorial discretion.189 Still, it is possible that the CJEU will eventually come to 
find that a Member State’s failure to prosecute an environmental offence breaches the 
principle of loyal cooperation, for instance in the event that transboundary damage is 
caused by an action or inaction of an operator in a Member State; or if a Member 
State fails to cooperate with the authorities in another Member State investigating 
such transboundary environmental offences; or if the Commission and the CJEU 
regard the persistent failure by a Member State to apply criminal penalties for serious 
violations of EU environmental law to amount to a breach of the principles of 
effectiveness and primacy of EU law.190
Given those complexities and considerable differences in approaches to criminal law 
and environmental law enforcement in the Member States, it is understandable that 
the EU institutions aimed to leave a margin of discretion to Member States regarding 
the choice of penalties (criminal or administrative) to apply in individual cases. 
However, the overall effectiveness of the implementation of Directive can be 
significantly compromised by this flexibility in enforcement, given that ultimately the 
effectiveness, dissuasiveness and proportionality of the penalties available to the 
national authorities will depend on how they are applied in practice. It is submitted 
that the Environmental Crime Directive could have established a mechanism which 
184 ECJ, Case C-265/95, Commission v. France (Spanish Strawberries), [1997] ECLI:EU:C:1997:595.
185 Ibid., at paragraphs 50-52.
186 ECJ, Case C-68/88, Commission v. Hellenic Republic, [1989] ECLI:EU:C:1989:339.
187 CJEU, Case C-105/14, Criminal Proceedings against Ivo Taricco and Others, [2015] 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:555 (‘Taricco’).
188 See T. Timmerman, ‘Balancing Effective Criminal Sanctions with Effective Fundamental Rights 
Protection in Cases of VAT-fraud: Taricco’ 53:3 Common Market Law Review (2016), 779.
189 Taricco, n. 187 above, at paragraph 39.
190 On the principle of effectiveness see, e.g., Brasserie du Pecheur, n. 156 above, at paragraph 95.
reduced the level of discretion left to the national authorities in the Member States, 
for example by requiring the application of criminal sanctions in the event of a 
sufficiently ‘serious’ and ‘clear’ breach of an offence established in the directive, or 
in the event of repeated breaches of the environmental offences under the Directive.
191 This would contribute to the effectiveness and dissuasiveness of the penalties 
introduced for implementation of the Directive, whilst simultaneously allowing room 
for flexibility as regards the choice of penalties to apply in individual cases (thus in 
line with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality). Moreover, if such an 
initiative aimed at reducing the discretion of national authorities were to be adopted, 
it should be without prejudice of other (soft law) initiatives aimed at increasing 
awareness and cooperation of judges and public authorities in the context of 
environmental offences.192 This should include EU-wide sentencing and enforcement 
guidelines aimed at ensuring more consistent implementation of environmental law in 
the EU.193 In fact, it is possible that the requirement for ‘effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive’ penalties under the Environmental Crime Directive may influence the 
level of penalties actually applied by the national courts, as evidenced by the recent 
decision of the Dutch court of first instance of Zeeland-West-Brabant, which 
sentenced an offender to a prison sentence of twelve months for violations of Article 
2.35 of the Waste Shipment Regulation,194 with reference to the ‘effectiveness, 
proportionate and dissuasive’ criteria and the principle of loyal cooperation.195
It is particularly problematic that the Environmental Crime Directive does not contain 
a requirement for regular review of its operation and implementation (in contrast with 
other EU environmental legislation, such as the Environmental Liability Directive).196 
A regular review process would have enabled more effective oversight by the 
Commission of the application of criminal penalties in practice by individual Member 
States. This limitation of the Directive may reflect the fact that the Directorate-
General (DG) Environment of the European Commission does not appear to be 
playing a primary role in overseeing the implementation of the directive, but instead 
the DG JUST (despite the fact that the directive was originally adopted by the DG 
Environment). Therefore, the potential for [intra-]institutional frictions in 
coordinating the oversight of implementation of the Directive is real.
The application of environmental criminal penalties by the Member States is also 
dependent on the operation of specific EU criminal law instruments adopted under the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice aimed at facilitating inter-State cooperation in 
191 One example that illustrates how this could be implemented is Directive 2009/123/EC of 21 October 
2009 Amending Directive 2005/35/EC on Ship-source Pollution and on the Introduction of Penalties 
for Infringements, [2009] OJ L280/52, Article 5.(a)(3), requiring the criminalization of ‘repeated minor 
breaches’.
192See, e.g., the European Network for Prosecutors for the Environment (ENPE), 
(<https://www.environmentalprosecutors.eu>), the European Union Forum of Judges for the 
Environment (EUFJE) (<http://www.eufje.org/index.php/en/>), and the Network for the 
Implementation and Enforcement of EU Environmental Law (IMPEL) (<https://www.impel.eu>).
193 As proposed by C. Gerstetter et al., n. 70 above.
194 Regulation 1013/2006, n. 12 above.
195 Rechtbank Zeeland-West-Brabant, ECLI:NL:RBZWB:2017:288 (24 January 2017). See also ENPE, 
‘ENPE Newsletter – Issue 4’ (2017), found at: 
<https://www.environmentalprosecutors.eu/sites/default/files/document/ENPE%20newsletter%204th%
20edition%20June%202017%20FINAL_0.pdf>.
196 Directive 2004/35 of 21 April 2004 on Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and 
Remedying of Environmental Damage, [2004] OJ L143/56.
criminal matters, in particular the 2014 Directive on the Freezing and Confiscation of 
Instrumentalities and Proceeds of Crime,197 the 2002 European Arrest Warrant 
Framework Decision,198 the 2008 EU Framework Decision on Organised Crime199 
and the 2009 Framework Decision on Conflicts of Jurisdiction.200 The lack of 
coordination between the EU enforcement bodies and the national judicial and police 
authorities is a significant problem facing Eurojust and Europol201 in countering waste 
trafficking and management infringements.202 Moreover, the effectiveness of the 
initiatives adopted by Europol and Eurojust is ultimately limited given that that those 
agencies do not have the power to bring prosecutions or start criminal investigations 
in the Member States, instead playing the role of coordinating the actions of national 
authorities. In this regard, one important initiative was launched in 2011, entitled 
‘EnviCrimeNet’, which collaborates with Europol with the objective to provide an 
informal platform for countering environmental-related crimes, including through the 
improvement of exchange of information and the gathering of criminal intelligence; 
training officers and exchanging best practices.203
CONCLUSIONS
The EU Environmental Crime Directive succeeds in providing a ‘framework’ for 
environmental criminal law enforcement in the Member States. It is to be expected 
that the Directive will contribute towards enhancing the deterrent effects of the 
national system of sanctions for environmental offences. Yet an assessment of the 
national implementation of the waste offences under the Directive shows important 
inconsistencies in the implementation. However, those inconsistencies may not in 
themselves be sufficient to establish the necessity and proportionality of a future 
instrument harmonizing environmental criminal penalties given that the Directive 
only adopts minimum standards. Moreover, since the maintenance or introduction of 
stricter standards is permissible for a legislative measure adopted under Article 192 
TFEU, the Member States will not have to transpose literally the criminal offences 
under the Directive so long as the standard adopted is equal or higher than those under 
the Directive. It is encouraging that, in comparison with the situation following the 
adoption of the Council 2003 Framework Decision on environmental crime,204 there 
is a notable improvement in the implementation of environmental criminal offences 
and penalties in the Member States. And although the Article 258 TFEU infringement 
proceedings against specific Member States for non-compliance with the Directive 
are still ongoing,205 it remains to be seen whether enforcement proceedings will be 
197 Directive 2014/42/EU of 3 April 2014 on the Freezing and Confiscation of Instrumentalities and 
Proceeds of Crime in the European Union, [2014] OJ L 127/39.
198 EAW Framework Decision, n. 143 above.
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200 Framework Decision 2009/948/JHA of 30 November 2009 on Prevention and Settlement of 
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201 V. Mitsilegas and F. Giuffrida, The Role of EU Agencies in Fighting Transnational Environmental 
Crime: New Challenges for Eurojust and Europol (Brill, 2017).
202 See Europol, n. 9 above; Eurojust, n. 147 above; EEA, n. 15 above, at 5.
203 See Council of the European Union, Draft Council Resolution on the Creation of an Informal 
Network for Countering Environmental Crime – ‘EnviCrimeNet’ (20 May 2011), found at: 
<http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10291-2011-INIT/en/pdf>.
204 Annulled by the Court of Justice on 13 September 2005 in Environmental Crimes, n. 21 above.
205 The Commission has released reasoned opinions in June 2011 for eight Member States (Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal and Slovenia); and subsequently to 
Austria, Finland, and the United Kingdom in October 2011 for failing to transpose the Environmental 
brought by the Commission before the CJEU against Member States for failure to 
implement the Directive with ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ penalties, 
despite their criminal nature.
It is clear that the inconsistencies in transposition of the Environmental Crime 
Directive may not be the biggest challenge facing the implementation of the 
Directive; this ultimately will be its application in practice by the national authorities. 
It appears that the current levels of harmonization under the Directive are insufficient 
to ensure the effective enforcement of environmental law. Indeed, there is a risk that 
without further action the Directive may come to be regarded as another example of 
‘reactive’ legislation aimed to show that ‘something has been done’, rather than 
necessarily bringing fruitful changes to the enforcement practice in the Member 
States. Moreover, the effectiveness of the implementation of the Directive depends on 
a range of other factors beyond the transposition of criminal offences and penalties. In 
particular, it will depend on the effectiveness of specific EU criminal law instruments 
adopted under the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.
Since the environmental criminal offences transposed into national law will also 
constitute administrative infringements based on violations of EU environmental law, 
it is paramount that additional measures to foster the cooperation between the 
administrative and judicial authorities are introduced by the Member States to 
enhance the effective implementation and enforcement of the Directive. Yet the fact 
that the Directive, at present, does not harmonize criminal penalties – and the 
possibility that some Member States may resist the adoption of an eventual legislative 
proposal aimed at harmonizing criminal penalties– suggests that significant variations 
are likely to persist regarding the implementation and enforcement of environmental 
criminal law in the EU.
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